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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS UNDER
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

T

HREE attacks on administrative orders were made in the

courts in 1948 under express statutory right of judicial review. In Hawkins v. Texas Company' an effort was made to cancel
a drilling permit of the Railroad Commission, and appeal was.
taken in accordance with the provision of Texas Civil Statute
Article 6049c, Section 8.2 The special permit, granted to Hawkins
as an exception to Rule 37 and "to prevent physical waste,"
allowed him to drill a tenth well on a 21.6 acre tract of land in
the East Texas oil field. The Texas Company, owner of an oil and
gas lease of a 30.54 acre tract, lying north of and immediately
adjoining the 21.6 acre tract, and on which there are six producing wells, filed suit to test the validity of the permit. The decision
of the trial court cancelling the permit was affirmed by the Court
of Civil Appeals. Both Hawkins and the Railroad Commission of

Texas appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts'
judgment. The decision involved application of the "substantial
evidence" rule and has been discussed previously.'
Citizens and tax-payers of a home-rule city attacked the validity

of a city ordinance in Forwood v. City of Taylor.' Suit was instigated in the district court to enjoin collection of taxes under Texas
Civil Statute Article 1176b-2,5 which provides that persons whose

rights were adversely affected by ordinances of home-rule cities,
enacted in violation of Chapter 13 of Title 28, Texas Civil
Statutes, are entitled to injunctive relief in any court of compel Hawkins v. Texas

Company, 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. (2d) 338 (1948).
2 TFx. Rrv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6049c, § 8.
2 Comment, 2 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 334 (1948).
4 Forwood v. City of Taylor, .. _ Tex ....... 214 S. W. (2d) 282 (1948).
STx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1176b.2.

1949]

SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948

283

tent jurisdiction upon proper application and satisfactory proof.
It was alleged that the ordinance in question was void in that it
provided for a board of equalization of nine members rather than
three members as prescribed by Texas Civil Statutes Article
1048.6 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's action in
denying the injunction, pointing out that Article 1048 (contained in Chapter 5, rather than Chapter 13, of Title 28) applies
only to cities incorporated under the general laws, that Taylor,
Texas, is incorporated under home-rule charter, and that it therefore was subject to statutes relating to home-rule cities. Since
the Enabling Act7 did not limit the number of members of boards
of equalization the act of the home-rule city was authorized and
the ordinance created a de jure board.
In Canales v. Laughlin' citizens went to a district court to en.
join action under a resolution of a commissioners court. The district courts are given appellate jurisdiction over the commissioners
courts under the Constitution.' Plaintiffs claimed the resolution
was void since it created an office not provided by statute. The
resolution called for roads to be built, operated, and maintained
as a unit, and in addition provided for a county road unit administration officer with broad powers. Decisions of the lower
courts that the resolution was authorized were reversed by the
Supreme Court, which rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. Holding that such an office is not expressly provided for by statutes,
the Supreme Court reviewed relevant articles, Texas Civil Statute
Articles 6716-1 and 6737-61,1" to see if the appointment could be
justified under another name. The court decided that if he were
considered a road commissioner or superintendent, the appointee,
who was to receive $390 monthly, was paid too much in violation
of Article 6737, which limits road commissioners to two dollars
6 Trx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1048.
7 TE:x. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1165 et seq.
8 Canales v. Laughlin, __ Tex .
214 S. W. (2d) 451 (1948).
9 Tsx. CONST., Art. V, 38.
10 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6716-1, art. 6737-61.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 3

a day, and Article 6745, which limits road superintendents to
$1200 per annum in counties with over 15,000 inhabitants. In
addition, the resolution was passed in a special session instead of
a regular session and no term of employment was mentioned as
provided by Article 6743. If he were considered a county engineer, the court pointed out that no vote by qualified voters to authorize the appointment by the commissioners court was held as
required by Article 6716-1 and no statement was made that he
met the qualifications required by Article 6716-1. After discussing these articles, the court held that, since the statutory requirements for appointment had not been observed, the action of
the commissioners court, in so far as the appointment was concerned, was void. In answer to the defendant's claim that the
resolution was valid under Texas Civil Statute Article 1580,11
which authorizes appointment of agents by the commissioners
courts for certain named purposes "or for any other purpose authorized by law," the Supreme Court said that Article 1580 was
intended to cover the employment of agents in situations which
are not covered by specific statutes and that the specific statutes
discussed are controlling in this case over the general provision
of Article 1580.
NECESSITY

OF EXHAUSTING

RESORT
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The general rule is that persons aggrieved by administrative
actions may not have recourse to the courts until they first have
exhausted their administrative remedies. 2 A case of first impression on an unique aspect of this principle arose in 1948 in
Rosenthal v. City of Dallas,3 where it was successfully contended
that the rule applied not only to individuals but might likewise be
"1TRx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1580.
12 42 Am. Ju. 580 (1942).
13 Rosenthal v. City of Dallas, 211 S. W. (2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of
error refused.
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extended to municipalities in zoning cases involving the application of Texas Civil Statute Article 1011g,1 which says in part:
"Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person
aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the
municipality affected by any decision of the administrative officer.
Such appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time, as provided by the
rule of the board, by filing with the officer from whom the appeal is
taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of appeal specifying
the grounds thereof."
City of Dallas brought an action, in which twenty-six interested
persons intervened, to enjoin alleged violation of a zoning ordinance and maintenance of public and private nuisances by defendant. Operating under a city permit issued by an assistant
city building inspector, defendant was engaged in cold storage
and meat curing. Alleging the area was zoned for apartments
and that a prior non-conforming use of the premises for cold
storage had been abandoned at the time the permit was issued,
the city claimed that the permit under which the defendant was
operating was void ab initio and that the action of its agent in
issuing it was unauthorized.
The defendant pleaded res ajudicata or binding effect of the
original permit on all the plaintiffs, that his use of the property
was merely the continuation of a valid non-conforming use, that
the city was estopped to order revocation because vested rights had
accrued to the defendant by valuable improvements he had made
and by operation of the plant for eighteen months with knowledge of city officials and the interveners, and that the threatened
restriction of his property to an apartment use would constitute
a taking without due process of law.
On the first hearing, two of the appellate justices held that,
while the prior non-conforming use had not been abandoned at
the time the permit was issued, it had been so changed by the
defendant in making his dominant enterprise meat processing,
14

TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1011g.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

with refrigeration a mere incident, as to be terminated in fact,
that the issuance of the permit was unauthorized because violative
of a zoning ordinance, that a city is not estopped by the mistake
or unauthorized or wrongful act of its officers or agents, that
the defendant was creating a nuisance by its operations, and that
the trial court's decision in granting a permanent injunction
should be affirmed, modified, however, to the extent of releasing
the mandatory order for the defendant to tear down or remove
his buildings erected in accordance with the permit. In answer
to the defendant's plea that the action was a collateral attack,
the court held that the municipality was not bound by Article
1011g when an act of its building inspector is challenged as void
and violative of the zoning ordinance.
The dissenting justice, Justice Looney, held that the prior nonconforming use had not been abandoned at the time the permit
was issued, that the change in use by the defendant was not supported by pleadings of the plaintiff and should not Je considered
but that even if it were considered the change in use did not fall
outside the interpretation of "cold storage" given by city officials,
and that testimony of city inspectors indicated that no nuisance
existed. Holding that the doctrine of estoppel applies to cities
as well as to individuals and corporations, the dissent said that
the plaintiffs were estopped to revoke the permit since it had been
issued by an authorized agent of the city and no appeal had been
taken to the board of adjustment under Article 1011g either by
city officials or by interested individuals, or to complain of the
failure of the defendant to obtain an additional permit for the
extra expenditures or erections and alterations of buildings, since
the city, through its various officers and agents, knew such work
was progressing but failed to take any official action to stop it
for eighteen months. Ruling that the permit was authorized and
valid, the dissent held that since no appeal was made by any of
the plaintiffs as provided by Article 10 11g, the permit cannot
now be collaterally attacked.
On rehearing, one of the justices for the majority joined the

